Defendrix build history

Changelog.

Build history and release-candidate notes, newest first. Security-impacting changes are called out explicitly.

v2.0.0

SECURITY
  • ·File scanning now fails closed when a target disappears, changes during inspection, cannot be read, cannot be hashed, or a detector fails. Structured, bounded coverage diagnostics replace false-clean outcomes and survive faulty event subscribers.
  • ·The AMSI bridge now enforces strict string and buffer limits, bounded native-call concurrency, deterministic lifecycle synchronization, explicit overload results, and health telemetry for repeated native failures.
  • ·Fleet snapshots use a stable generation, monotonic sequence, and deterministic snapshot identity. Duplicate delivery is idempotent; conflicts, stale order, unknown generations, and retired-generation replay are rejected.
  • ·Accepted fleet state and its bounded telemetry audit batch commit together in one authenticated server transaction. Client progress advances only after an accepted or duplicate acknowledgement, so ambiguous failures cannot silently skip queued state.
  • ·Telemetry retention rollover now emits an explicit acknowledged coverage-gap record instead of silently advancing the cursor. Queued snapshots survive restart; new source events remain memory-only until the next snapshot is durably queued and the UI states that boundary.
  • ·Signed machine-authority logs and checkpoints now serialize every authenticated field in an explicit protocol order, eliminating reflection-order drift that could make a newly written authority file reject itself under concurrency.
  • ·Every desktop tab now uses one responsive page-header and state vocabulary, with measured runtime layout coverage for a 1920x1080 display at 150% scaling plus compact-window behavior.
  • ·Endpoint, first-party ravensoftworks.com authority, installer, portal, deployment tools, release evidence, and one-use hardware-bound Owner enrollment now share one exact v2.0.0 identity graph.
Notes

Status: v2.0.0 remains a release candidate. Public availability waits for trusted production signing, clean-VM lifecycle evidence, and independent efficacy, false-positive, performance, privacy, and penetration evaluation.

The existing Owner remains bound to the exact authorized server, device, full hardware identity, and canonical user. v2.0.0 does not add a generic hardware-ID administrator bypass.

Protection health reports measured runtime coverage and precise platform or permission failures. A configured toggle is not presented as a healthy interception boundary without evidence.

Public comparative antivirus claims still require a trusted production signature, clean-VM lifecycle evidence, independent efficacy and false-positive testing, performance measurement, and external penetration review for this exact build.

v1.10.0

SECURITY
  • ·License entry now uses the exact detected device, connection, full hardware identity, and canonical local user to claim or resume one authoritative seat without manual device fields.
  • ·Signing out clears only the remembered local session. The server seat, token, and exact hardware binding remain intact, so the device stays enrolled until an explicit permanent deletion succeeds.
  • ·Settings and interactive uninstall now offer an authenticated irreversible self-seat deletion flow. Requests are nonce-bound, replay-safe, exact-route authenticated, and recorded as permanent tombstones that block the old device or hardware identity from reclaiming the deleted seat.
  • ·A license can have only one privileged fleet identity. That Owner must match one finalized device, full hardware identity, and canonical username; privileged upsert cannot mint or move a second administrative identity.
  • ·Local and hosted licensing servers share permanent-deletion, idempotent retry, seat-count, role, replay, audit, and bounded-retention behavior. Implicit stale-seat recycling is disabled by default.
  • ·The uninstaller distinguishes confirmed deletion, already-deleted state, unconfirmed network failure, and post-delete local-cleanup failure without placing license material on command lines or in logs.
Notes

Permanent seat deletion is intentionally irreversible for the deleted license and hardware binding. Reinstalling on that binding requires a different license; there is no undo or administrator reset path.

Choosing to keep a seat during uninstall preserves the protected licensing and identity state needed for a same-device reinstall. Silent uninstall keeps the seat unless the explicit reviewed deletion switch is supplied.

This remains a controlled release candidate until trusted production signing, clean-VM lifecycle evidence, and independent efficacy, false-positive, performance, privacy, and penetration evaluation are complete.

v1.9.2

SECURITY
  • ·License identity is now bound to the exact server, device, user, and stable hardware identity. Pending activation has no authority, role changes are server-authoritative, and hardware migration requires the existing account secret.
  • ·Fleet user administration uses generation-bound, opaque keyset pagination with strict request shapes, bounded pages, replay-safe mutation handling, and a professional 24-row administrator view with explicit Previous, Next, and Refresh controls.
  • ·Username canonicalization is pinned to the Unicode 3.2 assigned repertoire before and after normalization, with matching desktop, local-server, and hosted-server acceptance rules.
  • ·Local license recovery and fleet authorization fail closed on corrupt state, invalid bindings, malformed cursors, replay attempts, cross-endpoint fields, directory-cap violations, or unverifiable role claims.
  • ·Administrator authorization failures now preserve the entire control surface behind a recoverable authorization gate, and every privileged tab waits for the real server-projected shell role before revealing controls.
Notes

This build preserves hardware-bound administrator access through the authoritative device binding. It does not introduce a generic hardware-ID bypass or local-only privilege shortcut.

The development installer is a locally verified release candidate. Public distribution still requires a trusted production signing certificate, hash-bound evidence for the auditable untransformed managed payload, clean-VM lifecycle validation, and independent efficacy, false-positive, performance, privacy, and penetration testing.

The security claims above describe verified controls and regression tests, not a claim of invulnerability or universal threat prevention.

v1.9.1

SECURITY
  • ·Remote-support frames now bind the verified peer identity, session ID, token, endpoints, permission, expiry, and per-kind sequence; replay, cross-peer response, over-grant, and stale-session attempts fail closed.
  • ·Persistent fleet-management trust is separate, default-off, and enrolled by a complete SHA-256 administrator fingerprint after fresh local administrator authentication. Discovery and the 9-digit connection code are never treated as authenticators.
  • ·DNS hosts enforcement now validates names, commits marker-owned rules atomically, preserves the file security descriptor, verifies readback, and reports failure instead of displaying an active state.
  • ·Every desktop tab received a truthfulness, accessibility, responsive-layout, live-theme, reduced-motion, hostile-text, and bounded-list pass; partial remote permissions now produce matching controls instead of dead buttons.
  • ·Release packaging now authenticates and pins the installer compiler, binds one four-part version graph, verifies exact payload/SBOM inventories, stages reviewed consumer documents, and supports one timestamped signing identity for the endpoint, setup, uninstaller, evidence, and catalog.
Notes

Legacy LAN policy mutation, peer executable push, destructive persistent-management commands, and the incomplete federated-IOC transport are disabled in this build. Their earlier authentication and memory-only replay boundaries were not sufficient for unattended authority.

The development installer remains unsigned and is intended for local demonstration and controlled engineering evaluation. Public distribution still requires the production certificate, approved legal/toolchain inputs, authorized live dependency advisories, clean-VM lifecycle testing, and independent efficacy, false-positive, performance, and security evaluation.

No local test result establishes vulnerability-free operation, universal prevention, certification, or superiority to another antivirus product.

v1.9.0

SECURITY
  • ·Hardened trust boundaries: exact executable identity replaces directory, command-line, and certificate-presence shortcuts in self-trust and remediation decisions.
  • ·Authenticated recovery: quarantine state, pending process actions, update staging, fleet messages, and license exchanges now reject tampering, replay, stale identities, and oversized input.
  • ·Fail-closed release pipeline: production packaging audits its dependency closure, emits a SHA-256 payload inventory, requires a valid production signing identity, rejects unsafe endpoints and secrets, and blocks stale installers.
  • ·Accessible visual system: desktop themes share contrast-tested semantic tokens, visible keyboard focus, reduced-motion behavior, and UI Automation labels; the portal mobile menu traps and restores focus.
  • ·New: calibrated evidence fusion. Weak signals from every engine now combine on one subject with a Bayesian likelihood-ratio model instead of a naive count — three trivia can no longer look like an attack, and two near-certain observations escalate immediately.
  • ·New: anytime-valid escalation gate (opt-in). A betting test-supermartingale gives a provable bound on false escalations even under continuous monitoring — turn it on for the strictest false-alarm control.
  • ·New: real network decoys (opt-in). Defendrix opens decoy listening ports so a device scanning your LAN for targets reveals itself; a scanner that merely connects is a weak signal, one that sends traffic is a strong one.
  • ·New: graduated containment (opt-in). Response is matched to certainty, and destructive policy intent is recorded while the realized file action remains recoverable quarantine.
Notes

Cleaner Security overview: the dashboard now shows a Protection modules board at a glance instead of a scrolling activity log, and activity surfaces classify severity more accurately (routine, benign protective actions no longer appear as critical threats).

New advanced controls live under Settings → Advanced protection and all default OFF.

Honest scope: this release ships user-mode detection, correlation, reversible remediation, and explicit pending-review handling. A signed file-system minifilter and production model bundle are separate future release gates, not active protection in this build.

This remains a release candidate, not an independently certified antivirus release. Production gates include credential rotation, signed installer generation, clean-VM lifecycle tests, and independent malware, false-positive, and performance evaluation.

The bundled signature source is screened for malformed, placeholder, duplicate, and conflicting records. Accepted records are detection inputs, not a claim that every sample has been independently validated.

v1.8.5

FEATURE
  • ·New: image-bake tool (deploy.exe) for Enterprise plans. Sysprep-friendly, zero-touch activation on every clone.
  • ·Introduced the customer-dashboard seat workflow. Current builds limit portal release to eligible non-admin devices after fresh reauthentication; permanent in-app self-deletion is separate and irreversible.
  • ·New: unattended activation flag. Pre-seed the license key in HKLM and the agent activates itself on first launch, no wizard.
Notes

License server: input bounds on IssueKey (days ≤ 100 years, seats ≤ 10 000), admin-action audit logging, per-key abuse monitor (log-only by default).

The license-server hardening takes effect on the next scheduled server restart. We schedule restarts rather than interrupting live activations.

v1.8.4

IMPROVEMENT
  • ·Deploy stack: fleet-wide silent install pipeline (Defendrix.Deploy.Core + Discover + WinRm).
  • ·LAN protections: ArpWatch + BruteForceGuard added. Threat-IP persistence between reboots.
  • ·False-positive guards: safelist gate + IsProtectedProcess check on every heuristic kill/suspend. WinVerifyTrust signature check before any Microsoft-signed binary is touched.
Notes

Protections tab: toggles now route through EngineControl (single source of truth). Fleet-push drift fixed: pushing a policy no longer diverges between the source device and its receivers.

121-test suite passing across the LAN + firewall protection layer.

v1.8.3

FEATURE
  • ·Historical seat lifecycle: the initial recycling workflow used a Freed tombstone and 90-day stale reaper. v1.10.0 later disabled implicit recycling and introduced explicit release and permanent-deletion boundaries.
  • ·Chassis-stable HWID: motherboard + CPU + disk serials (volatile fallback). It survives Windows reinstalls, so the same physical machine reclaims its seat.
  • ·'All seats in use' no longer wipes local state. Pool exhaustion is usually temporary, so clearing the client's settings over it was an overreaction.

v1.8.2

IMPROVEMENT
  • ·Remote-support pipeline revamp: dirty-tile streaming (RemoteTileFrame 0x84) over the existing Seal transport. Reduced idle bandwidth by 80% on typical desks.
  • ·Protocol registry: every custom Defendrix frame ID lives in one place, so a new engine plugging into remote support just registers its frame type.

v1.8.1

FIX
  • ·Setup Wizard: resized to 780x560 so every step stays readable without scrolling.

v1.8.0

FEATURE
  • ·First public release with the fleet mesh + LAN protection story wired end-to-end.
  • ·13 core protection engines available at launch: real-time, firewall, USB, honeypot, behavior, execution gate, fileless detector, ransomware correlator, boot guard, live patch guard, self-healing, self-defense, LAN protection.
  • ·Local license server (WPF) for on-prem / air-gapped fleets.

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Changelog · RavenSoftworks